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ABSTRACT: In 2004 the first urban aerial cable-car public transport system was 
introduced in the city of Medellín, Colombia. The imaginative application of ski-slope 
technology to high-gradient, low-income urban areas attracted widespread attention from 
city authorities throughout Latin America, as well as Europe and Asia. However a second 
cable introduced in 2008 has had far less impact, confirming the suspicion that, to be 
worthwhile, cable-car systems require specific minimum conditions in terms of urban 
morphology and population density, as well as concerted complementary action by city 
authorities in order to ensure that mobility benefits help improve the living conditions, 
economic opportunities and social inclusion of the affected area populations. This paper 
outlines the technical and financial aspects of the cable-car systems employed in Medellin, 
and examines the urban conditions and planning considerations required to ensure the full 
integration and maximisation of social, economic and political benefits for catchment area 
populations, and provides pointers to successful application in other cities of the world.   
 
Keywords: Aerial cable-car systems, public transport, urban improvement, mobility impacts, 
Medellin. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2004 the first urban aerial cable-car public transport system was introduced in the city of 
Medellin, Colombia. The impact of the imaginative application of ski-slope technology to 
high-gradient, low-income urban areas has been considerable. As a relatively cheap, quick 
and highly visible response to urban transport problems, it has attracted widespread attention 
from city authorities throughout Latin America, as well as Europe and Asia. A similar system 
has already been built in Caracas and others are being developed in Rio de Janeiro and 
various cities in Colombia. 
In the case of Medellin, whilst the first line has been highly successful, the impact of a 
second cable-car line inaugurated in 2008 suggests that, to be technically and economically 
worthwhile, cable-car systems require specific minimum conditions in terms of urban  
                                                          
1 This paper is based on a current research project being undertaken by the Development Planning Unit, 
University College London in collaboration with the Universidad Nacional de Colombia (Medellin campus), 
and the Universidad de los Andes (Bogota). It is the first systematic appraisal of the pioneering experience of 
Medellin and looks to provide pointers for successful application in other cities of the world. An international 
workshop based on the results will be held in Medellin on the 12-14 of December of this year. Anyone 
interested should contact either of the authors. The research is funded by the UK Economic and Social Research 
Council and UKAid. 
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morphology and population density, as well as careful articulation to the existing mass public 
transport network. Furthermore, considerable expectations revolved around the social 
benefits that the cable-cars would bring to the poor and marginalised urban areas where they 
have been implemented. The assumption has been that improved access and mobility options 
available to the poor would, per se, lead to improved opportunities and better living 
conditions.  
While there is ample evidence to demonstrate that, in general terms, the lack of 
mobility is an integral part of the condition of disadvantage and deprivation (Social Exclusion 
Unit, 2002; Kenyon et al., 2006; Urry, 2007; Ohnmacht et al., 2009), it is far from clear that 
the opposite is true: that marginally improved mobility options for the poor lead directly and 
inexorably to social improvement. Recent sociological theorising (Kaufman et al. 2002, 
2004) has emphasised the importance of context. In other words, although mobility is a 
generalised characteristic and requirement of contemporary society, how mobility options 
operate and are inserted into economic and social routines, the positive outcomes it produces 
and so on, depends on the specific conditions of any given community or social group.  
The audacious decision to build cable-car systems in the poorest and most violent 
sectors of the city of Medellin was heavily influenced by these sorts of social consideration, 
initially in a intuitive way and later through more systematic planning. The analysis of the 
impact of the aerial cable-car systems in Medellin is therefore an excellent opportunity to test 
some underlying assumptions about the significance of mobility for the poor and to evaluate 
the planning policy and urban interventions which have accompanied them.   
 
The Medellin cable-cars in context 
In this section we briefly introduce the transport and planning history and events which set 
the scene for the urban cable-car systems, describe their technical and financial 
characteristics, and outline the urban contexts in which they operate, before concluding with 
some reflections on the questions of institutions, governance and political will and 
opportunism.  
 
Genesis 
The introduction of aerial cable-cars systems as part of the public transport infrastructure was 
undoubtedly an imaginative leap, with no urban precedent, some unmapped technical 
territory to negotiate and considerable local cynicism regarding the proposal. However, the 
3 
 
materialization of the first cable-car system arose from a constellation of circumstances 
which not only explain the genesis of the project but also offer important signposts for the 
adoption of similar systems in other cities. 
The first cable-car system, Line K, was built in the poor and inaccessible northeastern 
sector of the city. This sector is characterised by a difficult, steeply sloping terrain broken by 
deep smaller valleys carved by the numerous streams running down the hillside to the main 
river. Developed through informal settlements and land invasions dating from the 1950s and 
‟60s, by the end of the century it was the most densely urbanised sector of the city, with over 
400 dwellings/hectare. As a consequence, road infrastructure was minimal and access 
difficult, although the area was relatively well served by conventional buses. The second 
cable-car line was to traverse a similar but more diverse physical and social landscape in the 
western sector of the city.  
The accessibility problem was made even more evident when the city‟s overground 
Metro mass transport system was introduced in 1995. As the main Metro line (the only one in 
that sector of the city) runs parallel to the main river, a cable-car system was an attractive 
idea for bringing passengers down from the hillsides to the Metro system itself. The Metro 
authorities insist that this was always a socially-motivated project – a way of extending the 
benefits of the Metro to the poorest and more inaccessible areas of the city – but it also 
provided a way of increasing passenger numbers for a then underused Metro capacity. In the 
late 1990s various studies and technical consultations were undertaken by the Metro, so that 
by 2000 it had become a technically and financially feasible project.   
Only the political moment of opportunity was needed. The year 2000 happened to be 
an electoral year, and the Metro de Medellin company presented the cable-car project to the 
mayoral candidates. Whilst most rejected it, the eventual winner, Luis Pérez (2001-2003), 
happened to be as keen an enthusiast of cable-cars as the newly-appointed head of the Metro 
de Medellin company. There was, as the (still) head of the Metro company describes, an 
„alignment of the planets‟, and the new mayor immediately committed the city authorities; 
three years later it was in operation (personal interviews with Luis Pérez and Ramiro 
Márquez, General Manager of Metro de Medellin).  
The speed with which the cable-car system was implemented and its articulation to 
the city‟s overall transport system owes much to the city‟s institutional and governance 
structure. The publically-owned Metro de Medellin company and the city authorities worked 
closely together in both a technical and financial sense, helped by the fact that the control of 
the Metro de Medellin company lies nominally in the hands of central government (arising 
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from initial financial backing and eventual debt guarantee). Central government is in fact 
represented mainly by the local business and civic elite, which ensures a business ethic 
prevails over political expediency. Although this has led to periods of tension over technical 
matters (for example over bus feeder routes and a complementary rapid bus transit system 
currently under construction), these have generally been resolved on the basis of the 
efficiency of the Metro and a shared commitment to urban improvement.     
 
Technical and financial considerations  
There are currently three aerial cable-car lines in operation, two of which are urban public 
transport systems (Line K inaugurated in 2004 and Line J in 2008), along with a third Line L 
introduced in 2010 which connects with Line K as a tourist route to an ecological park on the 
edge of the city (see Table 1 and Figure 1). 
Cable-car systems are relatively cheap and quick to construct, since they require little 
land acquisition and the technology is quite simple. In the case of the Medellin cable-cars, the 
first line (Line K, 2 km.) cost in the region of US$24 million, and the second (Line J, 2.8 
km.) around US$47 million (at exchange rate values at the time). The cost per kilometer in 
urban areas compares favourably with RBT and rail systems. It should be remembered 
however that aerial cable-cars are not mass-transit systems and do not move more than 3.000 
passengers per hour.  
The cable car-system is a public sector project, financed jointly by the municipality and 
the Metro de Medellin, a publicly-owned company responsible for the building and operation 
of the city´s metro system in operation since 1995. Modest construction costs make public 
sector capital borrowing quite feasible, but in the case of Medellin all three lines have been 
financed through normal capital investment budgets. The financial contribution of the Metro 
de Medellin company is based on the calculation of future returns accruing from increased 
passenger number using the Metro over a 10 to 15-year period, and the difference is made up 
by the city authority in terms of social investment.  
An important source of municipal finance for these and similar projects is the publicly-
owned Empresas Públicas de Medellin, the city‟s large and efficient utilities company 
providing electricity generation and distribution, water and sewerage, waste disposal, 
telecommunications services. Statutorily, 30% of the company‟s profits go to the municipal 
authority, a sum equivalent to around US$250 million in 2010. The Metro de Medellin claims 
to be one of the few metros to make an operating profit. It has a single tariff for any length of  
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Table 1: Metrocables de Medellin – basic data 
 
Source: Metro de Medellín 
 
 
 
journey, the single journey basic rate currently stands at Col$1,750 (US$0.97), the frequent 
travelers fare is Col$1.450 (US$0.80) and a combined metro-bus fare of Col$2,000 
(US$1.10). The basic conventional bus fare is $1,500 (US$0.83). It is important to underline 
that the cable-cars (Lines J and K) is part of the Metro system and therefore involves no 
additional cost for Metro users.  
 
 
 
Map 1: The Metro system with Cable-cars (yellow dotted lies J and K) 
 
Source: Metro de Medellin 
 
 Line K  Line J Line L 
Date of operation August 2004 March 2008 February 2010 
Construction time 14 months 15 months 10 months 
Longitud  2.072 m 2.782 m 4.469 m 
Commercial speed  5 m/s 5 m/s 6 m/s 
No. of  supports  20 31 25 
No. of stations  4   (incl.. Metro station) 4   (incl. Metro station) 2  
No. of cabins 
(capacity 10 personas) 
93 119 27 
Distance between cabins  60 m 60 m 340 m 
Installed capacity  3.000 passengers/hour 3.000 passengers/hour 1.200 passengers/hour 
Estimated total cost  
(US$ 2003) 
US$ 24 million 
(at average 2003  
exchange rate) 
US$ 47 million 
(at average 2007  
exchange rate) 
US$ 21 million 
(at average 2009  
exchange rate) 
Cost per kilometre US$ 11.6 million US$16.9 millon US$ 4.7  million 
Finance Municipality: 55% 
Metro: 45% 
Municipality: 73% 
Metro: 27% 
Municipality: 38% 
Metro: 34% 
Regional Govt - 17%;  
Min. Transport - 9%; Other -2%. 
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Cable-cars and urban crisis management 
The favourable „alignment of the planets‟ also had much to do with the overall urban 
situation. During the 1980‟s Medellin emerged as the epicentre of Colombia‟s burgeoning 
illegal drugs trade and during the 90‟s became the world‟s most violent city (peaking at 381 
murders/100.000 population in 1992), and many areas of the city were effectively 
ungovernable . At the same time the city was being forced to restructure its traditional 
manufacturing economy, and levels of poverty and unemployment were alarmingly high 
levels of (Brand, 2005). 
It was in this context that the first cable-car system was conceived and implemented, 
and to which the following administration targeted as the focus of urban policy. The 
independent mayor Sergio Fajardo (2004-2007) proposed to cancel the city‟s „historic debt‟ 
with those abandoned areas of the city, beginning with the sector of the first cable-car, the 
poorest and most violent of all (Davila, 2009). The first cable-car line became a prototype for 
subsequent interventions in the poor sectors of the city. A coherent and energetic policy of 
integrating the cable-car systems into the urban fabric through Integrated Urban Proyects 
(PUIs in their Spanish acronym form) was developed, centred around transport projects but 
aiming for urban improvement through a combined strategy on mobility, environment, 
housing and public space, and the goal of creating of new dynamic centres in previously 
atrophied sectors (Medellin –EDU, 2011).  
The PUIs form part of a wider policy of urban improvement in the poor sectors of the 
city through the provision of park-libraries and new schools, a high public investment in the 
poorest sectors of the city which was to become formalised and widely acclaimed as the 
city‟s  “social urbanism”  (Echeverri and Orsini, 2010; The Architectural Review, 2011; 
Brand, 2010), although the social impact of specific projects is somewhat unclear 
(MacNamara, 2009;  Blanco and Kobayashi, 2009; Cañon, 2010; Qunichía, 2011). High-
quality architecture was also a central feature of this version of the Barcelona model of urban 
regeneration applied to low-income and informal housing areas in a developing country 
context. 
How successful all this has been, and how sustainable it will be, is far from clear. Dealing 
with the illegal drugs organizations has been only „half a miracle‟ (Fukuyama and Colby, 
2011), urban violence has increased in recent years, reinvented gangs control the „barrios‟, 
and intra-urban forced migration has grown alarmingly (El Tiempo, 2011). It is quite clear 
from the above that any assessment of the impact of increased mobility on the living 
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conditions of the local population is a complex and multifaceted issue. As important as the 
transport system itself are the urban context and the set of urban interventions. With this in 
mind in the following section we outline some of the conceptual and methodological 
considerations developed during our research.  
 
 
Photo 1: Line K         Photo 2: Line J 
                           
 
 
                      Photo 3: Transfer station San Javier - Lines B and J  
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Mobility theory and research methodology  
Our research was motivated above all by an interest in how mobility affects opportunity, and 
the effects, in the case of Medellín, of how the Metrocable system might contribute to 
poverty reduction by improving income generation and the living conditions of the 
surrounding area population. 
The importance of mobility in contemporary society has been widely recognized, to 
such an extent that it has been proposed as a new paradigm for social organization (Urry, 
2007), under which mobility has changed from being a luxury to become a generalised 
necessity and heavy burden; being in movement, real or virtual, has become a demanding and 
stressful requirement (Bauman, 2000). The luxury nowadays, according to Bauman, consists 
of being able to escape the obligations of incessant movement. Being able to „immobilise‟ 
oneself has become the act of power of the new elite, which in turn implies an unlimited 
ability to choose where to be. At the other extreme are the social groups anchored to a 
particular place through the absolute lack of mobility resources and choice (Zibechi, 2008). 
As Bauman observes, increased mobility does not homogenise society, rather it stratifies and 
polarizes, liberating some individuals to act at a distance, free from any spatial ties, whilst 
imprisoning others in a particular locality.   
Much sociological work on mobility has concentrated on the hypermobility of 
wealthy Western societies and the importance of mobility to economic opportunity and 
individual freedom, (Ohnmacht et al., 2009; Freundal-Pedersen,2009; Social Exclusion Unit, 
2002). In less-developed societies, the poor have a narrow absolute limit to the number of 
journeys possible because of miserable incomes, which in turn limits their chances of 
becoming less poor. In his study of the implications of transport costs for people living in the 
poor periphery of Santiago de Chile, Ureta (2008) found that this peripheral location limited 
people´s ability to travel by foot, at the same time as the high cost of public transport relative 
to family income restricted people´s movement patterns to the strictly essential (work and 
education). As a consequence, this limited mobility restricted people‟s participation in urban 
life in general, and their opportunities to expand work horizons, social and leisure activities, 
political and civic engagement, and so on. The lack of mobility converts geographical 
marginalisation into deeper social exclusion. 
The lack of mobility becomes an additional form of social inequality. On top of the 
traditional (vertical) stratification of society according to wealth, income, education and 
status, mobility develops a „horizontal‟ dimension which further fragments and accentuates 
9 
 
existing social divisions around things like age, gender, ethnicity, lifestyle etc. (Ohnmacht et 
al., 2007). The young, old, infirm, uneducated become more vulnerable under hypermobility. 
Moreover, mobility is closely related to leading-edge technology and its appropriation, new 
forms of surveillance, with important cultural implications in terms of „creating flows of 
meaning‟ and „cultures of movement‟ in an everyday sense (Olsen, 2009). 
Of course neither transport infrastructures nor social landscapes are flat and uniform. The 
need to recognise the social and cultural differentiation of contexts led Kaufman et al. (2002, 
2004) to consolidate the notion of motility, or the real or potential capacity to be mobile and 
its significance in different socio-spatial contexts. Mobility, they argue, constitutes a new 
kind of capital, the appropriation of which requires: 
 Access: or the range of possible mobilities according to place, time and other 
contextual restraints, constrained by options (the systems of transport and 
communication available) and conditions of that access (costs, logistics, and other 
restrictions). 
 Competences: or the skills and abilities that relate directly or indirectly to access and 
appropriation, whether physical, cognitive or organizational.  
 Appropriation: or how agents (individuals, groups, networks, institutions) interpret 
and act upon those options; it incorporates needs, plans and aspirations as well as 
motives, strategies and values.  
In applying the Kaufman et al. schemata to the Medellín case, we considered the access 
factor to be less important than might have been expected. The cable-car system was built in 
low-income areas with a deficient road infrastructure but relatively well served by 
conventional buses. However, the cable-car system involved no extra cost for Metro users, 
and the tariff was only marginally more expensive than buses (and much cheaper than a two 
bus journey). The logistics of cable system user was more sophisticated and demanding than 
buses, and considerable effort was made to train users prior to and at the beginning on 
operations. This can be seen as developing user competences, in terms of the knowledge and 
skills needed to gain access to the system and use it appropriately. However, such 
competences are divergent from and often at odds with the more informal skills needed for 
everyday routines in the „informal‟ environments of low-income areas, and this was to be 
something we needed to be sensitive to.  
This leads us to the third aspect of the Kaufmann et al. schema concerning the question of 
appropriation. The use of the cable-car system was an infrastructural articulation to formal 
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urban life, and especially formal sector employment. For social groups outside formal 
networks or whose everyday routines were circumscribed to the locality, then the level of 
appropriation could be expected to be much lower, or even antagonistic. Kaufman et al.‟s 
warning as to the different meanings and consequences of mobility options in particular 
cultural and socio-spatial contexts was to be valuable one. In short, the context of informality, 
conflict and violence into which the cable systems were retro-fitted, was a key consideration. 
If poverty conditioned access, informality and conflict could be expected to affect the logics 
of use and appropriation. The cable cars were also a means of getting the formal sector and 
state agencies into previously no-go areas – a well known strategy throughout urban history 
(but little considered among contemporary transport studies).  
In short, from the mobility literature and its adaptation to the particular context of the 
cable-car systems in Medellin, we were able to apply some useful concepts, especially that of 
motility, in the following terms: 
 The need to take into account the double sense of access: for the inhabitants to the rest 
of the city and for the city authorities to previously no-go areas. 
 The need to differentiate between the rationality of the city administration and the 
logic of the inhabitants of those sectors in terms of everyday survival. 
 The need to understand the cable systems as a strategy of normalization of the 
behaviour and aspirations of „informal‟ social organization. 
 
The Medellin Metrocables: mobility impacts and urban improvement potential  
Precise measurement of the impact of the Medellin cable-car systems is difficult for two 
major reasons.  Firstly, as indicated above, impacts are not direct and mechanical, but are 
determined in relation to a socio-spatial context that is itself constantly changing. Secondly, 
limited data availability in informal sectors of the city makes even the measurement of trends 
problematic, let alone the attribution of causality. Thus, for example, estimation of the impact 
of the cable-cars on the local economy, family incomes or house prices is not only hampered 
by the lack of official data, but also affected by short-term economic cycles, fluctuation in the 
level of internal violence, flows of displaced-person immigration, other urban, economic and 
social programmes, and so on.  
Furthermore, the cable-car systems have been implemented in close conjunction with 
urban improvement projects (PUIs), which makes disentangling the effects of mobility from 
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general improvement even more difficult. This applies equally to purely qualitative 
phenomena, such as the effects of cable-cars/urban improvement on local pride, community 
self-esteem, the sense of urban integration and social inclusion. In dealing with these 
challenges and in addition to documentary information, our research adopted an approach 
similar to that recommended by Flam and Kaufman (2006) using (travel) surveys, focus 
groups and a variety of interview types in order to achieve an approximation of impacts and 
an understanding of their nature, and relation to the cable-car systems themselves. Results to 
date can be summarized as follows: 
 
 
                         
                            Photos 4 and 5: Urban space improvements, Line K. 
 
                                  
                                                   Photo 6: Station, Line J 
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Mobility and travel behaviour  
The most obviously expected impact of the cable-cars was improved mobility in terms of 
shorter journey times and greater comfort. In optimum conditions, Line K, for example, 
allows a cable-car/Metro journey 10 kms from and 350 metres above the city centre to be 
undertaken in 20 minutes. However we found that this assumption needs careful 
qualification. Firstly, access to the cable-car/Metro system can involve lengthy periods of 
walking and queuing, zero in off-peak but over an hour in peak periods. Secondly, travel 
patterns need to be taken into account, with the journey to work especially linked to more 
distant non- city centre destinations. Thirdly, the tariff structure is important. The combined 
tariff, single ticket involving the cable-car/Metro + bus, makes cable-car use economically 
attractive for long journeys with a transfer to another mode of transport (savings of 33% 
compared to two bus journeys). However, for a non-transfer journey say to the city centre, a 
conventional bus can be marginally cheaper and quicker once waiting/walking times are 
taken into account.  
A consequence of the above is that the major group of cable-car beneficiaries is 
formal sector workers (in the construction, manufacturing, services) with long north-south 
journey to work patterns. Even here, the advantages for these users are more in terms of 
money than time. The results of a user and non-user survey we undertook are currently being 
analysed and modeled to determine the relationship between cost, time, comfort and safety as 
regards modal decision-making for different social groups in the area of influence. 
For people in the informal sector of the economy (the great majority), children and 
young people, housewives, the elderly and infirm, the cable-car/Metro system offers much 
more restricted advantages and therefore more limited use. Less than 10% of the journeys in 
the area of influence (as defined by local administrative boundaries) use the cable-car/Metro, 
conventional buses and walking continue to be the major transport modes, and there is little 
evidence to suggest an increase in the number of journeys made for non-essential trips 
leading to greater participation in city life.  
 
Mobility and the local economy 
A second major expectation concerned the positive effects of improved mobility on the 
economic condition of the zones of influence and the livelihoods of the inhabitants. It was 
supposed that better public transport options and greater accessibility would facilitate city-
wide employment opportunities for local residents, as well as invigorate the local economy in 
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terms new businesses, more (formal sector) employment, increased building activity, livelier 
land and housing markets, and so on. 
Once again, the evidence to date indicates only modest changes in this respect. While 
it is true that in the immediate vicinity of the stations and where urban improvements have 
been undertaken below the overhead cables, the number of shops, bars and restaurants, 
workshops and small-businesses has increased significantly. However, outside these tightly 
defined areas, neither small-scale economic activity nor house prices or rents appear to show 
important changes. In the second system, Line J, where the stations are less well articulated to 
urban morphology and street patterns, these types of benefits are still less evident.  
Advice bureaux for small business have been established in the community centres 
(park-libraries) close to each of the cable-car systems, backing up better mobility with 
technical and financial services for business set-ups. However, poor connection to city-wide 
institutions and markets, and limited finance programmes, have restricted the scope of new 
small businesses to micro-scale enterprises and neighbourhood markets with little prospect of 
sustained growth which might impact on the poverty and inequality currently affecting the 
city (Bateman et al., 2011).  
From 2004 onwards there was an increase in the number of formal property 
transactions in the areas of influence of both cable-car lines, but this reflected a general trend 
across the city. The quality of life index for the areas of influence of the cable-cars showed 
unstable trend while the human development index showed a general improvement since 
2004. Interestingly, neither of these indices includes a measurement of mobility.  
 
Urban improvement, social inclusion and citizenship 
As was mentioned earlier, the cable-car systems have been accompanied by so-called Integral 
Development Projects (PUIs in their Spanish acronym). The philosophy behind these projects 
is that better mobility is only a part of area regeneration in the deprived sectors of the city, 
and that transport infrastructure needs to be complemented by improvements in housing, 
schools, the environment and public space if wider and sustained improvements are to be 
achieved. The first PUI was developed around the first cable-car line (Line K) and since then 
three other s are being implemented in strategic areas of the city. Another important aspect is 
that of high quality architecture which inspires community pride, self-esteem and a sense of 
belonging” (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2008). 
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This was, in the course of events, to become known as “social urbanism”, a key aspect 
of the „Medellín model‟ of good urban governance recognized by the Organisation of 
American States and many other urban development and architectural bodies. It was hoped 
this adaptation of the Barcelona model of urban intervention would lead to a „profound social 
transformation‟ and a „new social contract‟ in the deprived and violent sectors of the city, on 
the basis of „spaces for citizenship‟and „settings for democracy and peaceful cooexistence‟ 
(Alcaldía de Medellín, 2008). Within this radical political agenda, our research suggests that 
questions of age and gender equality and access for the disabled are only recent concerns.   
Our research confirms the increase in community self-esteem and the sense of 
inclusion that the cable-car systems and urban projects have produced. The great majority of 
residents is proud of what has happened in their communities and are welcoming to visitors 
and tourists; once stigmatized, they now feel part of the city. However, Medellin‟s version of 
„social urbanism‟ has not been without criticism. The early projects were highly participative, 
recent ones much less so; concerns have been raised about future maintenance costs; the 
architecture has been criticized for its plagiarism and ostentation; some argue that the city 
administration has been carried away, literally, with its own success, has overstretched its 
resources and is now more concerned with constructing an image than transforming reality.    
   
Political significance 
The creation, via the cable-cars and associated urban improvements, of a sense of inclusion is 
an important political benefit, in both an internal and external sense. City administrations 
gain in legitimacy and governability vis-a-vis the urban population, whilst the aesthetic 
impact of cable-cars and high-quality architecture in poor urban areas fascinates the 
architectural profession and can be used to promote an economically competitive and socially 
progressive image. The attraction of cable-car systems for city mayors, including those of Rio 
de Janeiro and London, is easy to understand.    
In contrast to the modest impacts in terms of increased mobility and material 
wellbeing, the cable-car systems can be seen as having an enormous symbolic significance. 
Architectural and engineering gestures, aesthetic experience and sensation determine the 
political response of neighbourhood residents and external visitors alike. Adroit manipulation 
of the symbolic world, especially in the context of contemporary urbanism of the spectacle, is 
undoubtedly important and effective.  
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The cable-car systems can also be understood as dispositives for the normalisation of 
informal sectors of the city. The cable cars carry with them social norms, strictly enforced 
rules of behaviour, everyday surveillance, heavier policing, administrative procedures, 
information registers, and so on. Most residents accept this as something positive or at least 
necessary, although it does provoke a degree of discomfort, inconformity, and resistance. As 
a form of social control it fails to reach illegal (rather than informal) social groups and 
organisations, for whom a parallel strategy of repression is being implemented in those same 
sectors.  
Finally, the Medellin experience is a timely reminder of the unique capacity and 
ultimate responsibility of the public sector – public institutions, public investment and state-
run enterprises – with regard to urban improvement in the poor areas of cities.   
 
Conclusions 
 
The success of the first cable-car line in Medellin (Line K) was such that it made the 
implementation of such a system look easy. The second line (Line K) made clear that such 
infrastructure requires careful and systematic integration into social and spatial networks in 
order to ensure that increased mobility results in more generalised urban improvement. In this 
respect, it is important to underline the fact that investment in complementary urban 
improvement projects was around six times the cost of the cable-car system itself, not 
including the cost of the social programmes undertaken in the area.   
But even there doubts remain as to the wider effects of greater mobility through cable-
cars. They are used by a minority of residents (less than 10%), complementary urban and 
architectural spaces probably less still; benefits for the local economy have been limited, and 
land and housing market stimulus has been restricted to the immediate environs of the cable 
lines. Even so, these benefits should not be undervalued, given the relatively low cost of the 
cable-car systems themselves.   
However, the greatest benefits accrue around the symbolic value of cable-car systems. 
These highly visible infrastructures and the aesthetic experience they afford to both residents 
and visitors, create sensations of social inclusion and integration into the modern city, and 
develop local pride and promote individual self-esteem. It does, however, raise the question 
of how long this can be maintained without support through economic growth which reduces 
poverty and inequality, and incorporates citizens into democratic urban life in a more 
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systematic way. The spectacular nature of the aesthetics of the cable-car systems loses its 
appeal against a backdrop of unmitigated poverty. 
Whatever the case, other cities considering the implementation of cable-car systems 
need to ensure the satisfaction of the basic conditions of (i) a topography and morphology 
which inhibit more conventional and higher capacity public transport systems, (ii) relatively 
consolidated housing areas where qualitative improvement is possible, and (iii) the need for 
governance structures which facilitate rapid and coordinated implementation. Cable-car 
systems in Medellin have been successful (in transport, urban and social terms) to the extent 
that they form part of a concerted policy of integrated improvement of low-income areas. 
Against all prima facie visual evidence, the quick fix approach motivated by short-term 
political impact and publicity-conscious gain are unlikely to be successful. 
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